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Preface: The Eagle of America versus the Barbary Vultures
When choosing a thesis topic, my primary goal was to zero in on a historical event which
would raise eyebrows. My desire to study ‘forgotten history’ goes far back, as I have enjoyed
learning about historical events not emphasized extensively by the majority of historians. As a
student almost finished with their undergraduate education in History and Political Science, I
believed I knew a good majority of historical topics in existence. This appeared true, according
to my Jeopardy track record, until I learned about the Barbary Wars. After asking my thesis
advisor, Dr. Skip Hyser, for a topic suggestion which would have plentiful sources, yet not be
overwhelming, Dr. Hyser suggested I write about the Barbary Wars. This topic would eventually
blossom into a historical fascination which would capture my interest over the next year.
Although I was hesitant to pick a topic, out of fear of growing bored, I quickly found studying
historical stories of pirates, war, and diplomacy would be anything but boring.
As a double major in History and Political Science, I hoped to include overlap between
the two disciplines in my thesis. Since I plan to study International Affairs in graduate school, I
hoped to make connections to such topics in my thesis as well. The Barbary Wars are the perfect
mix of my historical fascination with Early America, interest in the Early United States
government, along with eighteenth and nineteenth century diplomacy. I hoped to comprehend the
maneuvers of the time in this area and was provided with a holistic picture of diplomatic action
on behalf of the United States in the Mediterranean during these wars, even relating it to present
day diplomatic tactics. After my initial research, I proposed the notion that the Second Barbary
War ended at a faster rate than the First Barbary War, due to the increase in diplomatic tactics by
the United States on the world’s stage. At the time of the First Barbary War in 1801, the
Americans in charge were unprepared to handle the increasing threats of the Barbary pirates
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while attempting to combat the threat of the pirate attacks on American merchant ships.
However, due to an increase in United States naval ships, engagement in the War of 1812 against
Great Britain, and increasing global involvement, the United States became an older and wiser
nation diplomatically along with militaristically. This was evident considering the Americans
won the Second Barbary War in mere months, whereas it took them four years to win the First
Barbary War.
The Barbary Wars are a prime case for the exercise of American diplomatic tactics at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. While the United States previously took part in some
European conflicts, such as the Quasi-War with France from 1798 to 1800, the Barbary Wars
was the first full-on militaristic conflict which the United States engaged in, primarily through
naval battles. The main opponent of these wars, the Barbary states, consisted of Algiers, Tunis,
Tripoli, and Morocco, located in North Africa. From 1801 to 1805 the United States fought the
First Barbary War against the Barbary State of Tripoli; the Second Barbary War was fought
against Algiers. Frank Lambert’s monograph, The Barbary Wars, American Independence in the
Atlantic World, provides the background information necessary on the wars, not hampering on
the extreme details as many historians looking at this topic do.1
When observing at the Barbary Wars, the First Barbary War is notably more influential to
a new developing nation, as it demonstrated leadership and established an important facet to the
United States military, the navy. These concepts are ones historians focus on in their own
interpretations of the Barbary Wars, along with a variety of other topics and themes. It is
necessary to view the differing perspectives of other historians on the subject of the Barbary
Wars, due to the amount of research on the topic. The different takes on this conflict, ranging

1

Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005).
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from a focus on American captivity to history of the Barbary states themselves provided pieces
of a larger puzzle, which put together paints a holistic picture of the Barbary Wars.
Subsequently, a primary topic in the overall story of the Barbary Wars was captivity. This
discussion of captivity flips the script on what many would traditionally categorize captivity
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The collection of primary source documents in,
White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives,
highlights the plight of Americans who were taken into captivity by the Barbary pirates. Many of
these Americans were on United States vessels which Barbary pirates captured in the
Mediterranean. While the enslaved people during this time, in the eyes of many white
Americans, were typically from Africa, the unique perspective on this topic is one which appears
to fascinate historians. The captivity of Americans in North Africa had a massive impact on the
American public as a whole as well, which is documented in the article, “The Barbary Captivity
Narrative in Early America,” by Paul Baepler and Lawrence Peskin’s study, Captives and
Countrymen: Barbary Slaves and the American Public, 1785-1816. These accounts bring to light
how the acquisition of American slaves by the Barbary states shook the American people and
how they stood against it. The work by Robert Allison entitled, Narratives of Barbary Captivity:
Recollections of James Leander Cathcart, Jonathan Cowdery, William Ray, provides a further
perspective into the life of those who were captives in the Barbary states, which is an important
perspective to analyze in order to provide a holistic view on a key problem which sparked the
Barbary Wars.2
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There is a great deal of literature on the impact the leadership of President Thomas
Jefferson had on the Barbary Wars, primarily the First Barbary War. The idea to analyze
Jefferson’s contribution to the war and the leadership measures he took appears to be a recent
trend by historians, as much of the literature is far more recent. The perspective Joseph Wheelan
takes in, Jefferson’s War: America’s First War on Terror 1801-1805, puts Jefferson at the helm
of war. Wheelan takes into account the major adjustments made within the aspect of presidential
power under Jefferson and how his prowess and mindset set the precedent for latter conflicts.
James Sofka’s article, “The Jeffersonian Idea of National Security: Commerce, the Atlantic
Balance of Power, and the Barbary War, 1786-1805,” goes beyond Jefferson’s mere presidential
power to focus on Jefferson’s political philosophy. Sofka’s writing focuses on the political ideals
of Jefferson, which he possessed far before the Barbary Wars, which was made apparent within
his leadership style during wartime. Other scholarship in this area focuses on the general
presidential leadership of the time, providing a holistic view of how Jefferson’s executive actions
during the Barbary Wars impacted presidents during wartimes to come. Scholarly journal articles
such as Louis Fisher’s, “Unchecked Presidential Wars,” and Graham Allison’s, “Making War:
The President and Congress,” provide beneficial analysis of this concept. While it is important to
note his contributions, Jefferson is not the only key American figure involved in the Barbary
Wars.3
Naval history is another area many historians choose to analyze when looking at the
Barbary Wars. While there was a Continental Navy represented the United States during the
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Revolutionary War, many historians argue the Barbary Wars had the most significant impact on
the United States Navy. Glenn Tucker’s monograph, Dawn like Thunder: The Barbary Wars and
the Birth of the U.S. Navy, clearly states this perspective, even with the title of his work. The
Barbary Wars were initially caused by issues with the capturing of United States ships in the
Mediterranean and the capture of Americans made the navy become an essential component in
fighting the Barbary states to free the United States citizens. Benjamin Armstrong also believes
the Barbary Wars increased the use and importance of the United States Navy as the primary
method of battle during the Barbary Wars was maritime. Armstrong’s study, Small Boats and
Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the Early American Navy, highlights the
shift of the navy before and after the Barbary Wars. Many historians who have written about the
impact of the Barbary Wars on the United States Navy have the primary goal of showcasing the
navy was not the same after the Barbary Wars; it had gained far greater traction during the wars
helping establish the United States’ role in the Mediterranean. The primary source entitled,
Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers, demonstrates
first-hand accounts of both issues and victories shaped the United States Navy during and after
the Barbary Wars.4
While much of the literature on the Barbary Wars focuses on the previous themes, there
is a wide variety of scholarship which emphasizes other important aspects of the wars. Some
scholars chose to focus on the Barbary states themselves and how their roots shaped d the wars.
The study by John Wolf, The Barbary Coast: Algiers under the Turks, 1500-1830, provides
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students of history with context of how the Barbary states came to be. This is a crucial
perspective, as the influence of the Ottoman Empire on the Barbary states was key in shaping
their attitudes towards war.5
Other scholars chose to focus on American diplomacy and how it shifted during the time
of the Barbary Wars. Some historians argue whether United States diplomacy was widely on
display during the time of the Barbary Wars and possibly shifted, as noted by Ray Irwin in, The
Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary, 1776-1816, as well as George Best’s
thesis, “American Identity Crisis, 1789-1815: Foreign Affairs and the Formation of American
National identity.” Scholars additionally focus their research on topics such as the role of piracy,
William Eaton’s contribution to the wars, the impact of Great Britain on the conflict, and the
religious conflict. While these various topics are not given as much attention as others, it is
important to note they are responsible for creating a more universal picture of the Barbary Wars
and its impact on history in general.6
This work contains a descriptive account of the Barbary Wars, along with the
implications they had on Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first chapter
provides crucial context regarding the history of the Barbary states’ piracy and this impact on
Americans after the Royal Navy no longer protected American merchant ships. The United
States had come from having weak protection under the Articles of Confederation, along with a
dismantled navy, to slowly gaining back defensive power in the Mediterranean. The second
chapter demonstrates how the United States was pushed over the edge, leading to their eventual

5

John B. Wolf, The Barbary Coast; Algiers Under the Turks 1500 to 1830 (New York: Norton, Norton, 1979).
Ray Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (New York:
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ix

engagement in war with the Barbary states. The constant attacks on merchant ships and the
capturing of American sailors, along with selling them into slavery, showcased the pirates had
crossed the line. The third chapter captures the essence of the First Barbary War itself, including
both the highs and lows the United States experienced during the war. This chapter provides
context about American diplomacy and war tactics proved successful in ensuring an American
victory. When the United States believed they were in the clear, the fourth chapter demonstrates
the Barbary threat had not diminished, with the occurrence of the Second Barbary War. Despite
the continuing threat, the United States was far more successful at winning this war against the
Barbary states at a quicker rate.
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Abstract
The First and Second Barbary Wars were incredibly influential in shaping the diplomatic
and military tactics of the early United States. These wars were fought against the Barbary states
of Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, and Algiers, located on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa. The
First Barbary War lasted between the years of 1801 to 1805. The First Barbary War began due to
the United States’ desire to no longer pay tribute sums to the Barbary states, along with an
increase in the number American merchantmen captured and enslaved by the Barbary states.
Tripoli served as the primary aggressor in the First Barbary War and after years of naval battle,
the United States won the war with a successful bombardment of Tripoli. After an interwar
period and engagement in the War of 1812, the United States took part in the Second Barbary
War in 1815. Algiers continued the practice of increased tribute sum demands, along with
continued enslavement of American merchantmen. However, this war only lasted mere months,
as the United States had sharpened their naval tactics and become more decisive diplomatically.
These wars served as springboard for the United States to engage in widespread global
diplomatic endeavors and allowed them to become a stronger nation as a whole.

xiii

Chapter One: The Pirates of the Mediterranean
The Barbary states of Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco were located in Northern
Africa, adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea. This region dubbed the Barbary coast, an offshoot of
the Ottoman Empire, where member states served within one of the most powerful empires of
the time. The attitudes within the Ottoman Empire significantly influenced the views of those
who lived in the Barbary states, evident in the ruthless pirate attacks on merchant ships in the
Mediterranean Sea from Ottoman military philosophy. The location of the Barbary coast was
crucial in the establishment of state-sponsored piracy, which the Barbary states would engage in
regularly, especially in the time of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This
became a constant problem in the Mediterranean, especially for countries which did not have a
strong naval presence in this region.7

Map of the Barbary coast and Mediterranean Sea from the eighteenth century.8
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Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005), 69, 5.
Jacques Nicolas Bellin’s 1764 atlas “Le Petit Atlas Maritime; Recueil De Cartes Et Plans Des Quatre Parties Du
Monde...” contains a map of the Barbary Coast, Clemens Library: University of Michigan,
https://clements.umich.edu/exhibit/barbary-wars/barbary-wars-images/barbary-maps/.
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1

The Mediterranean Sea was an important and well-travelled trade corridor for southern
Europe, the Ottoman Empire, western Middle East. This region contained shipments from all
over the globe. The Barbary pirates targeted merchant ships as a capitalist enterprise and sought
to confiscate valuable cargo for profitable sale. Since the British empire and Royal Navy were at
its height while the Barbary states ravaged the Mediterranean with their piracy, their extensive
and powerful military presence kept Barbary attacks against British merchant ships at bay. At the
time of the American Revolution, the Royal Navy was the largest navy in the world. This
attribute was important to note, as the British empire protected their own freight, along with the
goods from their colonies. Under the British flag, a ship had considerable protection, even from
the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean Sea. If a colony no longer flew the British flag on their
ships, their chances of attacks by the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean Sea increased
astronomically. The United States learned this lesson after they broke from the British in 1776.
Ships which flew the American flag were less likely to be successful in Mediterranean trade and
more likely to encounter a Barbary pirate attack. A letter future President Thomas Jefferson
received from friend Samuel House showcased this when he stated: “He hopes the
Commissioners intend action against the Barbary pirates: ‘They are a great hurt to our Trade
insomuch that no American Bottom can procure a freight in Europe. The difference of Insurance
is such that every Merchant Orders their Goods shipped in British Bottoms.” The United States
would learn the hard way that British protection in the Mediterranean was more important than
they ever realized.9
In the course of the eighteenth century, oceanic trade served as a primary way to
distribute goods across the world. Many nations were economically dependent on imports and
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Lambert, 15; Samuel House to Thomas Jefferson, 28 May 1785, The Jefferson Papers, Washington, D.C.: National
Archives and Records Administration, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-08-02-0128.
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exports from their colonies. Thus, the disruption of their shipments, capture of their sailors, and
occupation of their ships through piracy was a primary obstacle countries needed to overcome in
order to succeed in commercial trade. United States sailors and merchant ships were primary
targets of pirates from Morocco, Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers and their first true raid occurred
while the United States were under the Articles of Confederation. The Articles of Confederation,
which guided government administration within the United States from 1781 to 1789, provided
Congress with the most power to deal with these raids, which proved ineffective. In regard to
United States power at sea, the Articles of Confederation clearly outlined this concept of the
United States: “...shall never engage in war, no grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of
peace, not enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor
ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of the United States...”
This lack of power given was one of the many reasons the United States chose to implement a
new Constitution to replace the weak Articles of Confederation.10
It is important to note the Ottoman Empire seized the Barbary states in the seventeenth
century and exerted immense influence on these states. The Ottoman Empire thrived on the
mentality of a militaristic society, and this attitude transferred into the North African states. The
Barbary pirates took the ability to plunder and raid ships in the Mediterranean to an entirely new
level, in which they managed to outlast other forms of piracy at the time. The Barbary states
were the perfect storm of piracy since they had an incredible geographic advantage, the
population fit to engage in piracy, along with a strong naval force. This robust navy allowed the
pirates to successfully attack weaker naval forces and defend their own coasts from any attacks.
Many states engaged in trade within the Mediterranean did not want to cross the Barbary pirates

10

Lambert, 4-12, 49; U.S. Congress, United States Code: Articles of Confederation-1777,
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out of fear their ships would be raided, and their sailors would be taken captive. While Secretary
of State in 1791, Jefferson wrote a report on a petition of Charles Colvill, a British army officer.
While at first glance, this report does not grab attention of those interested in the Barbary states,
Jefferson’s documentation explicitly details his concern over the situation of American captives
in North Africa. The report was ambitious with its hopes to: “...enter into Treaty for our
Captives...whether this would not have the precise Effect of establishing a high Tariff for our
future Captives, and thereby attracting piratical Expeditions against them of Preference...” Thus,
to keep the Barbary pirates at bay, many European nations paid tribute to the Barbary states,
which protected their ships from pirate attacks most of the time. This piracy began as a socioeconomic proposition in the Mediterranean, but quickly turned political with the captures of
sailors, many of which eventually became slaves within the Barbary states.11
The British colonies in North America previously shipped their goods across the
Mediterranean and around the world under the British flag, but the economic consequences of
the British Navigation Acts were a primary reason of the American Revolution. Despite
acknowledgement of their freedom from the British, the newly formed United States was not
truly free in terms of shipments and trade. The new nation suddenly found themselves subject to
the British Navigation Acts again if they wanted to trade successfully in the Mediterranean. The
Navigation Acts, written in 1660, clearly state: “...all admirals and other commander at
sea...having commission from his Majesty...are hereby authorized and strictly required to seizure
and bring in as prize all such ships or vessels as shall have offended contrary...” In fact, the
British were even key contributors to their struggles in the Mediterranean, as they would engage
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Ellen Churchill Semple, “Pirate Coasts of the Mediterranean Sea,” Geographical Review 2, no. 2 (1916): 134-151,
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in impressment of American sailors amidst this time. The British wanted the United States to be
attacked, so they could, “...camp our flourishing commerce still further...” and still have the
primary naval presence in the Mediterranean. The problem with the British would eventually
come to a head with the War of 1812, but the issue with the Barbary pirates appeared far more
urgent in this time the United States was an utterly defenseless entity engaged in trade.12

Impressment of American Seamen by the Royal Navy.13

Amid the 1780s, as Barbary pirate attacks on United States ships arose, John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson served as the primary American diplomatic negotiators. The two men
disagreed on the necessity to declare war on the Barbary states. Jefferson believed if the United
States did not fight, then they must pay tribute to the Barbary states for many more years, which
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Quoted in Lambert, 4, 15, 76; An Act for the Encourageing and increasing of Shipping and Navigation,
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would be costly for the country in the long run. John Adams, who differed from Jeffersonian
belligerent ideals, believed the engagement in war with the North African pirates was not logical.
Jefferson noted his perspective on this situation in North Africa in his 1821 autobiography. He
wrote: “Our commerce in the Mediterranean was placed under early alarm by the capture of two
of our vessels and crews by the Barbary cruisers. I was very unwilling that we should acquiesce
in the European humiliation of tribute payments to those lawless pirates, and endeavored to form
an association of the powers subject to habitual depredations from them.” The United States was
already a fragile new nation and could end up in a constant military struggle thousands of miles
from the country. Adams additionally did not want the United States to lose money in a hopeless
military struggle with the Barbary pirates; the country was already in enough debt from the
American Revolutionary War.14
Another diplomatic hurdle was the ineffectiveness of the United States government to
handle the situation. The Articles of Confederation had many problems, specifically, the states
possessed considerable diplomatic power and frequently negotiated foreign trade agreements.
The government under the Articles of Confederation specifically limited military power: “No
vessel of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any state, except such number only, as shall be
deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled, for the defense of such state, or
its trade...” There was a fracture in the United States at this time between northern and southern
states’ interests, both economically and internationally, which played a significant role in the
established foreign policy. Based on the options of the legislatures, Adams believed the southern
United States did not want to pay for a costly war against the Barbary pirates. John Jay, the
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eventual Secretary of Foreign Affairs, proposed measures in support of Jefferson’s notion for
war, which still protected commerce. Jay’s well-versed diplomatic prowess gave him serious
credibility on this matter. The issues with the Barbary pirates brought to light the early internal
struggles of the United States and helped those involved in the government to see a need to shift
the governmental framework. The United States Constitution was ratified in 1789, which revised
the sickly United States government and shifted foreign policy powers from the states to a
stronger national government. Subsequently, Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution
demonstrates Congress has the power to,“....define and punish piracies and felonies committed
on the high seas...” The ability for Congress to have the power to punish such offenses came at
the perfect time, since the Barbary threat upsurged even more.
With the implementation of the new Constitution, Congress made the decision to build
new warships. Six new ships were approved to be built in 1794. The United States had a small
navy amid the American Revolution, but after the Revolution ended, they dispersed their navy
and its leader, John Paul Jones, went to Europe to work with the naval forces there. The ultimate
goal Adams and Jefferson agreed upon was to stop raids on American ships, with Algiers as the
primary culprit in the 1790s.15 Adams and Jefferson saw it essential to negotiate peace with
Algiers, primarily because they held many American sailors as prisoners. A 1785 letter from
Jefferson to Adams proposed a draft of this treaty with Algiers: “...My anxiety is extreme indeed
as to these treaties. What are we to do? We know that Congress have decided ultimately to treat.
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We know how far they will go...What are we to do?” Jefferson believed the Barbary states would
not cross the line, but little did he know what they had in store.16
The Barbary states primarily took American hostages from 1784 to 1796 and harassed
United States shipments as well. At this time, many Americans were distracted by both domestic
and international issues which appeared more important than the issues with the Barbary states.
The American declaration of neutrality under President George Washington, the Quasi-War with
France, and Napoleon’s rise to power all served as factors which were primary distractions of the
time.17
The Mediterranean piracy plagued the Adams Administration. While Jefferson and
Adams agreed the United States would no longer pay tribute to the Barbary states, the Barbary
states did not hear this message. This was even more evident when Tripoli made the first official
capture of an American ship in the Mediterranean in 1796. In conjunction with this incident, the
United States government sent American consuls to the Barbary states with the main objective to
keep peace, which had been negotiated but not solidified. Famous American Revolutionary War
naval captain John Paul Jones was initially selected to head the delegation to Algiers, but he died
in 1792. Well-traveled American diplomat Thomas Barclay was the second choice, but he too
died prior to the endeavor. Thus, Richard O’Brien furthered his own position as the United States
consul general in Algiers, when he was granted with superintendent-like power in Tunis and
Tripoli; James Leander Cathcart was the consul sent to Tripoli and William Eaton was sent to
Tunis. With the capture of the American ship and the onset of negotiations with American
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consuls, President John Adams predicted the Barbary states would make an attempt to gain more
tribute money from the United States and his idea was proved correct.18
In the midst of these conflictual matters, Americans viewed the Barbary pirates as more
than a legal or economic issue; they believed the pirates were true barbarians. These states had
built up a strong navy, which made it far easier for them to engage successfully in piracy and
prey on ladened and slower merchant vessels, like ships from the United States. What worsened
matters of the time was the capture of American sailors from the merchant ships, many of whom
were sold into slavery in the Barbary states. Thus, the first hostage crisis the United States
arguably occurred in the interim of the Adams Administration in the late eighteenth century.19
Though the United States lost British naval protection for their merchant ships when the
American Revolution began, other European powers made attempts to help the new nation
navigate the pirate-infested waters of the Mediterranean. Although France did not explicitly
agree to protect American ships, King Louis XVI of France promised to use his influence to
help the United States in some way, as stated in the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce. In
conversation with Jefferson, in regard to this treaty, Richard Henry Lee stated, “...Great Britain
has now two cards to play...either acknowledge the Independency of America and make a Treaty
of Commerce with her and thus be at peace with us...(or) submit to the uninterrupted progress of
French commerce...” This promise only proved beneficial to the United States for a short while,
as the French Revolution emerged in 1789, along with the removal King Louis XVI from power
altogether. The Swedish provided some additional foreign aid to American hostages taken within
the Barbary states, but many American politicians and citizens alike were upset with other
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European powers provided legitimacy to the Barbary states through the payment of tribute
sums.20
Americans merchantmen held hostage in the Barbary states served as a problem in need
of attention. Many Americans of the late eighteenth century sent monetary aid to the hostages in
North Africa and put immense pressure on the new national government to take action against
the Barbary states. To juxtapose this, sums other European countries paid in tribute to what the
United States had to offer to the Barbary states made the United States look cheap in
comparison. Even though the United States Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation
in 1789, the federal government was still relatively weak, which hurt them immensely in this
scenario. In the mid-1790s, Jefferson resigned as Secretary of State, so the pressure to fix the
hostage crisis fell upon the new Secretary of State, Edmund Randolph. While the American
hostages were in North Africa, a plague broke out, which caused an even greater demand for the
release of the American hostages, especially from the hostages themselves.21
A major push within the United States to free the hostages came in the Northeast,
specifically in seaport towns. Due to the federal government’s emergence as weak in the area of
foreign policy, the aid the American sailors held hostage in North Africa primarily came from
individual actions and donations. In Philadelphia, the Aurora General Advertiser called for the
federal government to take: “...the most expeditious and the most effectual measures, which
appear to have been too long postponed, to procure reparations for the past; to ensure safety for
the future, to foster and protect the commercial interests (of the United States)....” Noticeably,
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the United States was ill-fated with the state of the world and the lesser position they had been
awarded within the realm of Mediterranean commerce.22
The leader of Algiers, Dey Hassan, believed there was no need to end the raids on
American vessels and the American threats to Algiers left him incredibly unimpressed. The Dey
pushed for the greatest amount of monetary tribute, and eventually took charge of the United
States-Algiers Treaty, which was signed on September 6, 1795. Jefferson wrote to Secretary of
State James Madison in 1801 on the subject of the treaty: “I thought we had not only complied
with the treaty, but were doing considerably more.” Many American citizens and politicians
believed this treaty would end all problems occurred between the United States and Algiers, but
their confidence was eventually shattered with the continued activity of the Barbary pirates and
the hostage crisis on their hands.23
The American public took notice of the hostage crisis when Algiers seized over one
hundred Americans in 1793. The numbers of American hostages the Barbary pirates took
continued to increase. Between the period of 1784 and 1796, an estimated one hundred and fifty
men were taken hostage in the Barbary states, and only hundred and fifty men taken, only one
hundred and twelve were liberated. Although they were eventually freed, this measure did not
take place in a swift fashion, but made the United States to look indecisive and unable to
expedite protection measures for their own citizens on the world stage. Their poor ability to
liberate the American hostages in a timely fashion hurt the image of the United States and
allowed the Barbary states to view the new nation as one they could easily control, in terms of
trade and beyond. 24
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Slavery in North Africa was not exclusively based on race, but based on specific groups,
such as European Christians, North African Moors, and Sub-Saharan people.25 Merchant sailors
were an easy target because they often came close to the North African Barbary coast, which was
located near many significant trade routes in the Mediterranean. The Barbary fleets often took
American hostages were small in size but efficient in skill and were part of a capitalist enterprise
within the Barbary states. The treatment of these hostage slaves in the Barbary states was
incredibly brutal, especially the treatment of Christian slaves.26

A Slave Market in the Barbary states.27

All along the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, political stability was directly
linked to and dependent upon economic prosperity. This rang true for the United States, which
was excessively new and politically unstable. The piracy of Barbary states, specifically the
confiscation of cargo and enslavement American merchant sailors, operated outside the means
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and norms of eighteenth century civilized society. Congress saw the Barbary pirates as the
quintessential definition of barbarians who were, “...disgraceful to the arms of any enlightened
people....” O’Brien, who was located in Algiers at the time of the later raids also furthered
Congress’ claim with his belief of the major force behind the pirate raids and capture of
American merchant sailors was the end goal to tribute payments from the United States once and
for all.28
Barbary leaders made it commonplace to use the American hostages as a means to extract
money from the United States in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This form of
extortion was incredibly financially stressful on the new United States, which was still mired in
debt from the American Revolution. This debt was primarily a reason for the United States
precedent of global neutrality in the late eighteenth century. Captures of Americans by the
Barbary states caused many Americans to look back at their own revolution and call for an
increase in freedom. There was also an intense notion of American hypocrisy since the United
States’ involvement in the slave trade did not end until 1808. This added further complexity to
the issue of the slavery in the Barbary states and on the world stage. It appeared hypocritical for
the United States to condemn the Barbary states for enslavement a few hundred Americans when
the people of the United States had hundreds of thousands of African Americans in slavery.29
The captures of American hostages by the Barbary pirates and forced them to be slaves
turned an institution which was commonplace for the American people and turned it on its ear.
While Americans accepted enslavement of Africans in their own country, their hypocrisy was
showcased by their attitudes to towards this practice. On top of the issue of tribute sum payment
to the Barbary states to ensure safe passage of merchant ships in the Mediterranean, numerous
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problems increased for the United States, primarily since they were seen as a new and weak
nation. This perspective of the country would make them an easy target for the Barbary states as
the nineteenth century began, along with a war with a permanent impact.

14

Chapter Two: No More Tribute!
President George Washington prepared the American military for the possibility of
conflict. There was an obvious need for the United States to rebuild their naval force, especially
given the imminent threats from the Barbary states. Although Washington remained neutral
towards the conflict in France, he and Secretary of War Henry Knox had approved the creation
of six new frigates. Furthermore, Washington’s neutrality characterized much of early United
States diplomatic action between the years of 1789 to 1797. These frigates were created with the
intention to serve as, “...adequate for the protection of the commerce of the U.S. against Algerian
corsairs.” Frigates were relatively small ships which possessed the ability to maneuver in choppy
waters. Despite their size, they had a great deal of firepower, which sometimes consisted of more
than twenty cannons. These ships were designed with the goal to protect American interests in
the Mediterranean and combats against the Barbary pirates.30
While President Washington favored appeasement with the Dey of Algiers through sums
of money, a threat in the Mediterranean loomed. The connection between Algiers and the
Barbary states of Tunis and Tripoli worried Americans in charge. Naturally, Washington urged
Congress to be alert to the Barbary states’ actions and perceived the immense need for American
military power especially at sea. In an address to Congress, Washington furthered this point as he
said: “Gentlemen of the Senate and House of Representatives: I lay before you a report of the
Secretary of State on the subject of the citizens of the United States in captivity at Algeriers, that
you may provide on their behalf, what you shall seem most expedient.” The American public
was aware of the need for military action. It was no secret of an increase in the number of
Americans taken hostage and forcibly converted to Islam in the Mediterranean. In the course of
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his time in office, Washington kept in mind the specific cases of Morocco and Algiers, with keen
observation of the diplomatic ties between them and the United States. Problems with the
Barbary states were on the horizon and the requirement for diplomatic action was evident. In
order to address the issue at hand, Washington made a plea to Congress: “Gentlemen of the
Senate: I will proceed to take measures for the ransom of our citizens in captivity at Algiers, in
conformity with your resolution of advice of the first instant, so soon as the moneys necessary
shall be appropriated by the Legislature, and shall be in readiness.” The urgent need to release
American captives in the Barbary states only grew as the Adams Administration gained control
of the government.31

A sketch of Algiers during the eighteenth century.32
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Several prominent European powers grew accustomed to tribute payments to the Barbary
states in order to keep them from attacks in the Mediterranean. In this case, tribute sums were
equivalent to ransom payments. While Federalist Presidents Washington and John Adams
reluctantly paid the tribute sum, both tensions and price demands rose. Rumors spread across the
Mediterranean of a number of Algerian crews had taken over American ships. When this reached
the ears of Commodore Edward Preble, he was greatly upset. With vast experience in the navy
thanks to his service at the time of the American Revolution, Preble was a natural choice to lead
engagement in Mediterranean naval warfare. Preble further received information in the midst of
the Adams Administration, made up of an authentic list of ten ships commandeered by North
African pirate crews. Although the United States gained allies and strengthened ties again with
France, the Barbary threat could no longer be ignored.33
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Late eighteenth and early nineteenth United States Naval leaders.34

The problem of Barbary pirates’ enslavement of Americans in the Mediterranean was a
persistent issue for the early nation. The captures of these American merchantmen were first off,
a human rights tragedy, as more often than not these men were sold into slavery in the Barbary
states. Furthermore, the capture of Americans and their cargo had a negative economic impact. If
a crew or ship was captured, whatever cargo was on the ship would not be delivered, which
directly hurt the United States economy. Many ships passed through the Strait of Gibraltar; this
made them easy targets. Tensions between the United States and Great Britain mounted in the
post-revolutionary world, and British naval vessels began impressment upon American sailors
and ships.35 Attacks came on all sides against the Americans in the Mediterranean now. Without
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increase naval presence in the Mediterranean, the United States was unable to prevent these
attacks on their sailors.36
The sheer number of American sailors captured by the Barbary states quickly rose into
the hundreds by the turn of the century. Many of these men were imprisoned once they were
taken ashore. American leaders tried and failed repeatedly prior to the official declaration of war
to release the prisoners through diplomatic means. Preble also had a lack of clear instruction
from the eventual Jefferson Administration on how negotiations of American prisoners’ releases.
At base value, the United States could not expect to negotiate the release of these prisoners for
any less than $150,000 in total. As the outbreak of the war was imminent, the number of
American captives in the Barbary states grew exponentially, Preble and the United States Navy
were fed up. Although he kept in mind the religious customs between the Muslim Barbary states
and Christian United States were different, Preble viewed their religious customs as an
inexcusable explanation for their treacherous actions against United States sailors.37
The size of the navy had significantly decreased after the end of the American
Revolution. The sale of warship Alliance in 1785, signified the sale of the final ship from the
Continental Navy.38 Many Americans believed there was no need for a large navy once the war
with Britain concluded. This led to an increase in pressure placed upon the United States
government to downsize the current number of ships and not establish a national navy to save
money. As a result of the United States’ actions, the sole option to solve the problems of the
Barbary pirates was the payment of tribute sums. With tensions between the American shipping

36

McKee, 154-173.
McKee, 206, 269, 284-295.
38
The Continental Navy was under the instruction of John Paul Jones during the American Revolutionary War
against the British. After the war was over, the Continental Navy was not seen as a military priority within the
United States.
37

19

industry and Barbary pirates rose in the early years of the United States, so it was obvious naval
conflict would become inevitable. The United States quickly got to work on the construction of
new warships in the midst of the Washington Administration in 1796, but when they signed a
treaty with Algiers the same year, many Americans favored abandonment of this construction.
This was due to the costly nature of shipbuilding, along with the decrease in popularity of a
United States naval force. 39
Despite this, United States shipbuilding persisted, along with the creation of a small, but
mighty naval force. Under Washington, the United States Navy was established, but the
implementation of an additional Naval Department was another complex issue. There was an
obvious disjunction between the United States government and their navy, which unfortunately
made them an easier target for the Barbary states in the Mediterranean. The nation needed to put
aside their reservations towards increased naval power and recognize the necessity of an increase
in naval power to protect their Mediterranean assets.40
The loss in number of United States ships in the Mediterranean was a green light for
Barbary states to expand their attack on the United States explicitly.41 Other European states had
practiced payment of tribute sums to the Barbary states years prior to the United States’ creation,
so the Barbary pirates viewed this act as an essential component to any country engaged in
Mediterranean trade. The United States had different relationships with each Barbary state, so it
was important to know the diplomatic differences between each state. For example, Algiers was
first responsible for the capture of American ships and merchantmen as early as 1785; whereas,
Morocco had a productive diplomatic relationship in the years prior to the First Barbary War.42
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Without the protection of the Royal Navy, states like Algiers saw an opportunity to spread their
power and showcased to the Ottoman Empire they were worthy of recognition.43
While conflict between Algiers and Portugal in the midst of the final decade of the
eighteenth century kept Algerian pirates out of the Strait of Gibraltar, a sudden peace between
the two actors caused an increase in pirate attacks on American ships. Algiers was a key
perpetrator against American forces in the Mediterranean for years before the First Barbary War
broke out. The United States had not forgotten about Algerian pirates’ captures of eleven
American ships in 1793. United States consul William Eaton wrote in the years prior to the war
there would be no permanent peace with this adversary without ‘gold or cannonballs.’ With this
affirmation, he suggested either tribute payments or war were the only possible means to secure
peace. Eaton made it clear limited action would not gain them sudden respect from Algiers and
their leader, the Dey, let alone any other Barbary state. Other individuals like Joseph Barnes
wrote to President Jefferson in 1801 about the tribute sums: “To pay well, will ever be found a
less evil war than with these Barbarians—or the consequences may be extremely serious for our
countrymen...” There was an evident need to obtain peace between the Barbary pirates and
United States, yet the means to achieve it and satisfy both parties were uncertain at best.44
By the turn of the nineteenth century it was evident the United States did not treat all
Barbary states equally. These actions caused conflict in the Mediterranean and the brief period of
peace between the United States and Algiers was unsteady. Diplomatic Consul James L. Cathcart
eventually issued caution to all Americans in the Barbary states at the time with information of
43
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Algiers’ increase in militarily aggression. Furthermore, the Dey of Algiers demanded an increase
in tribute sums. The Dey furthermore refused to meet with Cathcart in 1801 to discuss the
conflict between the two parties. As time progressed, the Dey announced his patience to work
with the United States was exhausted. When previously promised supplies by the United States
did not arrive in Algiers, the Dey was infuriated. The Algerian Dey saw no need to keep the
peace with the United States if there was no benefit for him. Although the Dey seemed fed up
with the United States, Algerian vessels did not outright attack American merchant ships, unlike
their Tripolitan counterparts.45
As late as 1790, it became apparent an increased United States naval force was necessary.
Naval action against the Barbary pirates was needed even more so than before. The United States
government understood the importance of a naval presence in the Mediterranean. As the United
States showcased several naval warships in this region, they seemed more powerful and did not
come across as a weak, new nation. Because of this need, the Secretary of the Navy made the
decision to send a force under Commodore Richard Dale to the Strait of Gibraltar to protect
American merchant ships. President Thomas Jefferson discussed the heightened importance of
the naval appointments and warship construction, as he explained to other government officials
early. In a document of Jefferson’s, which included estimated expenditures in March of 1801,
Jefferson noted costs: “Protection of seamen 30,000...Algiers & Barbary 256,000...Naval
establishment...two large frigates and four small on war establishment for one year; The whole
establishment exclusively of contingencies on shore, marines, and building of ships after
deducting; Insurgent and Picker supposed for be lost is; Deduct the six frigates
retained...1,620,000...” This information alone provides context to the naval force the United
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States attempted to amass in the early days of the First Barbary War, along with the desperate
need for greater protection in the Mediterranean.46

Commodore Richard Dale.47

As time progressed, the United States government granted approval for construction of
frigates like the John Adams and the New York. A frigate is typically a hefty naval destroyer ship
which was initially used for convoy work. These exact warships were sent to patrol off the coast
of states like Morocco and Tunis and instructed to keep an eye out for any possible threats. Many
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of these ships were initially sent to the Strait of Gibraltar and from there focused on prominent
Barbary threats.48 The United States Navy kept a close eye on Barbary states and formed new
alliances with each other, specifically against the United States.49
As the Americans settled into the nineteenth century, the impact of Napoleon’s rise to
power in France was experienced across the Mediterranean. The Dey of Algiers eventually fell
out of favor with power in Constantinople, thus an increase the Algerian military in the
Mediterranean appeared like a natural way to increase Ottoman Empire recognition. In tandem
with this, Denmark, Sicily, Spain, and Sweden paid remarkable tribute sums to the Barbary states
in the summer of 1800. In comparison to some European nations, the United States’ tribute
payment was smaller, which increased the likelihood of pirate attacks on American commercial
vessels. Timothy Pickering, who was Secretary of State in 1800, was informed it was necessary
to send more United States naval ships into the Mediterranean in order to protect commercial
vessels from the Barbary pirates. Whilst in the Mediterranean, Consul Cathcart issued a formal
protest towards Algiers as early as 1800, in which he claimed that Algiers had gone against a
previous treaty with the United States and had become too aggressive in the Mediterranean.50
In conjunction, Tunis appeared to be in preparations for war against the United States. An
early attack, in the late eighteenth century, indicated the harsh actions Tunis inflicted upon the
United States in the Mediterranean. Tunisian pirates targeted the United States warship Boston
and badly damaged the ship in the attack. Despite this, the United States retaliated and sunk two
Tunisian cruisers, dismasted two more, and chased off the residual ships. This threatened the
United States Navy in the Mediterranean directly. The United States Consul in Tunis, William
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Eaton, demanded an increase in United States naval presence in order to combat the threat in the
Mediterranean. Eaton called for a thirty-six-gun frigate to meet him in Tunis, but Commodore
Richard Morris believed the movement of the squadron already present in the Mediterranean was
more beneficial. In response to the need, ships already located in the Mediterranean were sent.
This proved beneficial on part of the Tunisian threat, however weakened the forces who were in
combat with the Tripolitan pirates.51
It was evident in Cathcart’s documentation that the United States would lose any foothold
in the Mediterranean unless they took a firmer stance against the Barbary states. The Barbary
states had a serious policy to always be at war with a country, as it contributed to their economy.
Constant war heightened the fear they caused and showed other Mediterranean powers they
could be next in line to be attacked. Fear contributed to the ability for a continued process of
tribute payments by European nations in order to stay untouched in the Mediterranean. As the
constant act of war continued, the employment of the Barbary corsairs, as soon as a conflict with
one power came to a close, the Barbary states picked a fight with another power.52
Despite an increase in Mediterranean tensions, trade within the region continued to
flourish. United States consul to Tunis, Eaton, reported there were a number of Americans in the
Mediterranean in this time as well. Preble additionally told Secretary of the Navy, Robert Smith,
“...our commerce in the Mediterranean is immensely valuable and daily increasing and, should
the war continue between the European powers, we may engross nearly the whole business by
keeping up a respectable force to protect our vessels....” This statement highlights the importance
of the Mediterranean along with how the United States needed to secure a solid place as a
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regional member engaged in trade. The constant Barbary threat and increase in number of ships
attacked and sailors captured caused the United States to be at great risk in the Mediterranean. At
this point in the war, it seemed like the pirates consistently attacked the United States merchant
ships and warships from all angles. With the number of American sailors captured by the
Barbary states ranged from over one hundred prior to the war’s start, the situation was not good
for the Americans. Consuls Eaton and Cathcart mentioned their increased fears of the reckless
manner the Barbary pirates attacked the ships, as they additionally mentioned that unarmed
American merchantmen were at risk of possible threats. This reckless nature possessed by the
pirates consisted of the captures of sailors and termination of their vessels altogether, with no
regard for the traditional standards of warfare in the nineteenth century.53
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the United States still appeared relatively weak in
their fight against the Barbary states. Their military was unprepared for the naval warfare of the
pirates, as it did not follow the standard practices of war which subsequent civilized nations
followed. While it was evident the United States had lost considerable power, as they were no
longer under British protection in the Mediterranean, they showed up ready to fight the pirates
regardless. American leaders put their foot down once and for all, no longer with the desire to
submit themselves to a standard practice of the payment of a ridiculous tribute sum. However,
they were not ready for what would happen next within this Mediterranean conflict when Tripoli
truly entered the picture.
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The Barbary states in the context of a modern map.54
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Chapter Three: From Philadelphia to Tripoli
The Barbary states were immensely powerful by the time the United States became an
independent country in 1776. While faced with other threats in the Mediterranean, the Barbary
states remained a detrimental menace to the American shipping industry. This threat further
worsened when the aggressive actions of Tripoli rose after 1800. While Tripoli had always
proved problematic, their attacks on American merchant ships rose above their Tunisian,
Moroccan, and Algerian counterparts to serve as the catalyst for United States engagement in the
First Barbary War.
In the case of the First Barbary War, Tripoli proved to be the primary aggressor. The
leader of Tripoli, Pasha Yusuf, ordered Tripolitan pirates to target American ships within the
Mediterranean since the United States broke away from Great Britain. Yusuf believed the United
States previously demonstrated greater favor to the states of Algiers and Tunis in terms of trade
and tribute payments. The Pasha thought the United States had not provided enough tribute to
Tripoli. This led him to increase Tripolitan naval power in early 1801, and severed any
communications with the United States, as a positive relationship between the two powers was
no longer possible. This led to limited contact between the powers, which meant Consul James
L. Cathcart received fewer updates from the Pasha.55
The Pasha demanded the United States increase its tribute sum or face the wrath of war.
The United States sent several ships to the Mediterranean, well-aware war was on the horizon. In
early 1801, the American warships Chesapeake, New York, John Adams, and Enterprize entered
the Strait of Gibraltar, where several United States and Barbary ships were already located. As
the United States squadron arrived, naval conflict occurred between Sweden and Tripoli. The
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first true conflict which commenced the First Barbary War came between the United States and
Tripoli in 1801, when Tripolitan gunboats surprised American crews on the Enterprize and
opened fire. When the pirates attacked this American warship, the remainder of the ships in the
United States squadron rushed to its aid. The Enterpize, a schooner under the command of
Lieutenant Andrew Sterett, who deftly maneuvered his ship between the Tripolitan ships and
American cargo ship under attack.56 In the end, the United States proved successful and set
Tripoli’s ships ablaze, which caused the pirates to shift their focus to the extinguishment of the
fires. After a fierce three-hour fight between Sterrett’s forces and those of Tripolitan Admiral
Rais Mahomet Rouse, the Enterprize broadsided Tripolitan warships, thus the Tripolitans finally
admitted defeat. The encounter ended as the Tripolitan flag was thrown into the Mediterranean
Sea.57
In the aftermath of this naval encounter, on May 10, 1801, Tripoli declared war on the
United States, which marked the start of the First Barbary War. In response to the Pasha’s
declaration of war, Commodore Richard Dale mentioned his “...intentions in the first instance
were friendly; but the act of his excellency in declaring war against the United States had put that
deposition out of (his) power.” Dale made this statement incredibly clear to the people and
leadership in Tripoli as well. The first year of the war was remembered by the United States
blockade of Tripoli.58 This blockade led to a food shortage in Tripoli, which proved dire. The
United States impressively captured a Tripolitan polacca in 1801. Typically, polaccas were
vessels which possessed three masts and often carried cargo, and this specific polacca, which
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was a Tripolitan warship, attempted to break the United States blockade of Tripoli. This capture
served as an impressive early victory for the United States Navy.59 Lieutenant Andrew Sterett
and his crew on the warship Enterprize led this attack. When the Americans took over the
polacca, they removed the equipment and sent the ship back to Tripoli in utter shambles. In
response to this incident, Jefferson wrote a letter to Strerrett. This letter showcased the
president’s perspective on the naval force in the Mediterranean: “...I do myself the pleasure
without further delay of expressing...high satisfaction inspired by your conduct in the late
engagement with the Tripolitan cruiser captured by you...you have shewn to your countrymen
that enemy cannot meet bravery and skill united...” This was an incredibly significant event as it
showcased what could happen if the United States turned the tides and attacked the pirates’ own
vessels.60
While this blockade of Tripoli took place, trouble brewed in the adjacent Barbary state of
Tunis. United States diplomatic Consul William Eaton had clashed with Tunisian officials over
fundamental issues over the past years, and now the Tunisian leader, the Bey, wanted the United
States official to pay direct and equal tribute sums to the Barbary states. Eaton, located in Tunis
at the time, pressed Jefferson in a letter to, “...give your answer to the Bey of Tunis with care &
precision...” At this point it was natural for the other Barbary states to become involved in the
war between Tripoli and the United States. Connections with the other Barbary states along the
North African coast proved to be in Tripoli’s favor, since they could easily locate allies. Tripoli
did not progress in the war as much as they hoped, which upset other Barbary leaders who
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viewed their inability to defeat the United States Navy outright as a symbol of weakness. It was
clear the Pasha believed Tripoli gained much success, yet its naval prowess decreased. Cathcart
knew war was necessary, which demonstrated his frustration with the European practice tribute
payment to handle Barbary pirate intimidation. American leaders, notably President Thomas
Jefferson, viewed the war essential to secure the rights of Americans to trade in the
Mediterranean, but protection of American sailors became progressively difficult as other
Barbary states entered the conflict. Shortly after the first encounter in the Mediterranean,
President Jefferson wrote a letter to the Pasha of Tripoli. The letter, a sincere act of diplomacy on
the part of Jefferson, stated:
Great & respected friend. The assurances of friendship which our Consul has given you,
and our sincere desire to cultivate peace & commerce with your subjects, are faithful
expressions of our dispositions and you will continue to find proofs of them in all those
acts of respect & friendly intercourse which are due between nations standing as we do in
the relations of peace & amity with each other at the conclusion of our treaty with you we
endeavored to prove ourselves contended with it by such demonstrations as were then
satisfactory to you; and we are disposed to believe that in rendering into another language
those expressions in your Ire of the 25th of May last which seem to imply expectations
inconsistent with the faith of that transaction your intentions have been misconstrued—on
this supposition we renew to you sincerely assurances of our constant friendship and that
our desire to cultivate peace & commerce with you continues firm & unabated. We have
found it expedient to detach a squadron of observation in the Mediterranean Sea, to
superintend the safety of our commerce there & to exercise our seamen in nautical duties.
We recommend them to your hospitality and good offices should occasion require their
resorting to your harbours. We hope that their appearance will give umbrage to no power
for, while we mean to rest the safety of our commerce on the resources of our own
strength & bravery in every sea, we have yet given hem in strict command to conduct
themselves towards all friendly powers with the most perfect respect & good order it
being the first object of our solitude to cherish peace & friendship with all nations with
whom it can be held on terms of equality & reciprocity. I pray God very great and
respected friend that he may have you always in his holy keeping.
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This letter showcased an early diplomatic effort on the part of Jefferson, with the hopes of
conflict resolution through the diplomatic tactics which had previously worked. Unfortunately,
this means of communication were not enough in the eyes of Tripoli. 61
The United States Navy was aware of the military threat if the Sultan of Morocco
employed his entire force. If the Barbary pirates targeted American ships in the Mediterranean, it
would require the United States to fight back with an increased naval presence it did not have.
The threat of Morocco forced the United States to remain in the Strait of Gibraltar, with
increased surveillance of Moroccan ships along with the Barbary pirates. An alliance between
the states of Tripoli and Morocco occurred when American naval forces captured the Tripolitan
warship Meshuda. However, the Sultan of Morocco claimed he purchased the Meshuda from
Tripoli. This made the Meshuda property of Morocco which the Sultan believed he had the right
to remove the ship from the Strait of Gibraltar. Despite high tensions with Morocco, in addition
to Tripoli, the United States eventually approved the removal of the Meshuda. The condition of
this deal meant this would solely occur if the Meshuda was in the only the possession of
Morocco, not their Tripolitan counterparts. Even the Sultan of Morocco grew weary of the war in
the Mediterranean, as were many American officials. In his annual message to Congress at the
end of 1802, President Jefferson noted the importance of the increase of United States presence
in the Mediterranean. This was demonstrated when he mentioned: “There was reason...to
apprehend that the warfare in which we were engaged with Tripoli might be taken up by some
other of the Barbary powers...to secure our commerce in that sea, with the smallest force
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competent, we have supposed it best to watch strictly the harbour of Tripoli...” The ability to
ensure stability in the Mediterranean was a primary goal of the United States at this point in the
war.62
The Sultan of Morocco declared war on the United States in 1802. James Simpson,
United States consul in the Moroccan city of Tangier when this occurred, was notified directly
by the Sultan. Simpson passed on the word to the United States government caused much panic
and fear. Since Morocco was more militarily powerful than Tunis, their declaration of war
caused great concern for the United States. While Morocco did not possess significant naval
strength in comparison to Algiers and Tunis, the Sultan’s diplomatic power was a tremendous
threat. The Sultan was influential in both Atlantic and Mediterranean trade, so he was not
someone the Americans wanted as an enemy. A war with Morocco at the time of the Tripoli
entanglement meant conflict against the Barbary states gained greater traction spread across the
Mediterranean. This frankly did not bode well for the United States.63
Influential United States Naval Commodore Richard Morris remained an important figure
in the interim of the First Barbary War. In the late spring of 1803, he took his primary squadron
to the Mediterranean in the aftermath of the capture of Tripoli’s cruiser, the Meshuda.
Commodore Dale’s squadron captured the Meshuda. The Americans understood the significance
of possession of the Meshuda, as the possession of any Tripolitan ship was a victory for the
Americans. More often than not the Americans had their ships stolen, so this was a morale boost.
After several failed diplomatic attempts by Tripoli to get the Meshuda returned, the United States
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determined to destroy the cruiser and other vessels on the Tripolitan coast.64 The United States
grappled with the confiscation of American ships by Tripolitan pirates expanded in the
Mediterranean. At this time, the blockade was weakened by the need to divvy up forces to
address additional American conflicts with the other Barbary states. Eventually, the United
States made the decision to end the blockade of Tripoli.65 Despite its success, the blockade
wasted precious American resources which could be doled out to other United States vessels in
the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the United States Navy was incredibly new, and they already
struggled to maintain enough ships to successfully fight the Barbary pirates.66
As of 1803, Secretary of State James Madison stated it would be a necessity to secure
peace between the United States and Tripoli as quickly as possible. Madison viewed the
acquisition of peace as an important action since, “...all the other nations at war with him (Pasha
Yusuf) have yielded to the customary terms of peace....” If the United States were to continue to
fight the Tripoli pirates, the price of war would continue to rise astronomically. The United
States was after all, a new nation, forced to pay off war debt and defend themselves from British
impressment of American sailors on merchant ships. In Madison’s eyes, the nation did not need a
prolonged conflict. American leaders, consuls, and liaisons between Tripoli and the United
States proposed ideas to Commodore Richard Morris which consisted of the United States tribute
payment of $200,000 to Tripoli, along with money to pay for war expenses. They hoped this
would put an end to the conflict once and for all and chose to communicate this with him
directly. Even though the Tripolitans appeared to have ‘won’ the war at this point in time, they
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were also tired of the fight against the Americans in the Mediterranean and use of expensive
resources in the process. At this point in the war, the Americans initially appeared ready to
resolve the constant battles, not solely with Tripoli, but all Barbary threats.67

Former Secretary of State and President James Madison.68

The Tunisians fueled the fire of war when their pirates confiscated goods from American
ships in the Mediterranean in 1803. The Tripolitan blockade put the United States on high alert
of any suspicious Barbary action, so this raised concern on behalf of the Americans. The Bey of
Tunis remained obsessed with attacks on United States merchant ships with his key goal to
demolish American trade in the Mediterranean. Jefferson grew further frustrated with the state of
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affairs in Tunis, which mounted on top of the Tripoli problem. In a letter to Secretary of State
James Madison, Jefferson contemplated: “What are the delays in the performance of our
stipulations of which the Bey of Tunis, and Eaton complain? I thought we had not only complied
with the treaty, but were doing considerably more.” This imminent threat caused much fear in
Commodore Edward Preble, which prompted him to write American officials and ask for an
increase in United States naval presence in the Mediterranean. Specifically, he hoped to gain
more warships to fight the pirates. This was a lofty request, as the United States was notably still
in the midst of an upgrade to their navy in a post-American Revolution world.69

Commodore Edward Preble.70
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Despite some cooperation between Americans and Moroccans, Commodore Preble still
waged war on Moroccan warships. In response, the Sultan ordered the majority of Moroccan
ships to stay in the port until the conflict with the United States came to a close. The United
States Navy appeared optimistic towards transactions with Morocco, with the anticipation of an
end to the dispute in sight. The American shipping industry in the Mediterranean experienced the
detrimental impacts of Moroccan attacks, so they wanted to quell any possible threat. Although
the Sultan denied the attacks were made on American merchant ships with malicious intent,
United States naval officers were not as certain, as they had seen a trend of attacks like this,
made on purpose by other Barbary states like Tripoli. The threat of continuous warfare with the
United States was approximately what the Sultan did not want to endure, so he decided to give
into the demands of the United States. The Sultan of Morocco proceeded to ratify a previously
drawn treaty of 1786 between the two nations, which recognized the United States blockade of
Tripoli, and release any American ships under Moroccan possession. After a few weeks, tensions
between Morocco and the United States cooled, which signified the end of the conflict between
the two parties in 1803.71
By 1803 the United States had commandeered nearly all Tripolitan vessels in the
Mediterranean, as the rest of Tripoli ships were too large for the United States to attack. In
October 1803, the war turned in Tripoli’s favor. The Tripolitan pirates attacked the United States
warship Philadelphia and captured Commodore William Bainbridge and the entire crew. The
Philadelphia was one of the prized gems of the United States’ new naval force, so its capture
added insult to injury. Prior to this, Navy Agent Daniel Bedinger received a letter from the
Secretary of the Navy in which he specified: “The frigate Philadelphia is in commission and will
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sail for the Mediterranean as soon as she is prepared for Sea...” The Philadelphia had previously
served two successful tours in the Mediterranean in the midst of this war, the United States had
hoped this time would simply be a success. The ship, now in the possession of the pirates, was
initially docked in Tripoli’s harbor and the crew members were imprisoned. This incident made
the possibility of negotiations even more difficult for the United States. Commodore Bainbridge
wrote to Preble once the Philadelphia had been captured: “This letter conveys to you, the
distressing information of the loss of the United States Frigate Philadelphia under my command,
by being wrecked on rocks about four and a half miles from the town of Tripoli.” This situation
was not ideal for the relatively feeble naval presence the United States possessed in the
Mediterranean.72
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Depiction of the Philadelphia ablaze in the Tripolitan harbor.73

The United States prepared new ships to be sent to the Mediterranean in response to the
Tripolitan action. There was an increased need to act in defense of the United States especially
due to the capture of the Philadelphia. Bainbridge detailed the woes of the Philadelphia’s
capture to the Secretary of the Navy: “Misfortune necessitates me to make a communication, the
most distressing of my life, and it is with the deepest regret that I inform you of the loss of the
United States Frigate Philadelphia under my command by being wrecked on Rocks between four
and five miles to the Eastward of the Town of Tripoli...” The war now seemed to turn in favor of
the Tripolitan pirates.74
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Commodore William Bainbridge.75

The United States subsequently offered the Pasha of Tripoli $10,000 in tribute money,
which caused the Pasha to laugh. With the European nations of Holland and Denmark paid a
respective $80,000 and $40,000 to Tripoli the previous year, the sum of $10,000 was laughable.
In attempts to negotiate with Tripoli over the Philadelphia’s capture, President Jefferson was
consulted by Richard Farquhar in Malta. Jefferson’s ally posed the notion: “I understand your
late Consul at Tripoli has been the cause of this War...as I was a witness to the unfortunate loss
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of the Frigate Philadelphia and was of great Service to the Officers who was stript of every thing
I also advanced Capt Bainbridge three Hundred Spanish Dollars.” Farquhar was Consul Eaton’s
stepson who followed in the diplomatic footsteps of his father.76
Commodore Stephen Decatur, Jr. made a bold rescue attempt to regain the ship and its
imprisoned crew, which were unsuccessful in retrospect. Decatur burned the Philadelphia in an
attempt to keep it from any use by the Tripolitan enemy. This incident was detailed by Preble to
U.S. Consul John Gavino in early 1804, when he wrote:
...Decatur at 7 o’clock in the night, entered the Harbour of Tripoli, boarded and took
possession of the Philadelphia. The Frigate at the time she was boarded had all her Guns
mounted and charged...Decatur set fire to the store-rooms, gun-room, cock-pit, birth
deck, and with a firmness highly honorable to him...Decatur did not lose a Man and had
but one slightly wounded...
While Decatur was unable to successfully execute the rescue mission of the Philadelphia, the
American belligerent spirit still was demonstrated to be incredibly strong.77
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Commodore Decatur and crew in a failed rescue attempt, 1804.78

After the failed rescue mission of Decatur, Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith wrote to
Commodore Morris: “In adjusting the terms of peace with the Dey (Pasha) of Tripoli, whatever
regard may be had to the situation of his brother, it is not to be considered by you, of sufficient
magnitude to prevent or even to retard a final settlement with the Dey (Pasha).” Smith referred to
the hairbrained scheme concocted by the United States to unseat the Pasha and replace him with
his brother Hamet, who claimed to be an ally of the United States. Hamet wanted the United
States to help him gain power in Tripoli, then he would release the American prisoners and
create a treaty between the United States and Tripoli which ended tribute payments. The United
States would do whatever was necessary to end the practice of tribute payments to the Barbary
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states, as they feared it would allow states like Tripoli to establish dominance over them for the
long run.79
The Bey of Tunis remained antagonistic towards the United States throughout 1803 and
into 1804. This did not serve the United States well, since the war with Tripoli already required
so much naval attention. To divide its force in order to attend to each Barbary conflict would
weaken the United States Navy. Rumors swirled in 1804, which mentioned that the United States
had captured Tunisian vessels and furthermore enraged the Bey and other Barbary officials.
These rumors turned out to be true. When Consul Cathcart arrived in Tunis, the Bey refused to
receive him since he represented the United States. At the same time, news emerged from Tunis,
thus signified the Bey had every intention a declaration of war on the United States in the
subsequent months. The possibility of Tunisian ships at war with the United State grew
tremendously. This Tunisian preparation frankly alarmed the United States. If Tunis were to
officially declare war against the United States, it threatened the small American naval force in
the Mediterranean, which were already tired from combat against the Tripolitans. The Tunis
threat was significant because they possessed swift warships which could easily be overtaken by
American merchant ships. Furthermore, the size of Tunisian forces could overwhelm the small
American brigs and schooners. The United States squadron’s divide and conquer tactics also
made it easier for them to capture American ships and revealed United States naval weakness.
This was a tactic all of the Barbary states seemed to use against the Americans.80
As of 1804, the state of the war was not in favor of the United States. After the
humiliation in the diplomatic process to achieve peace, the United States decided they wanted to
sue for peace. Each time Commodore Preble demanded peace or damaged Tripolitan ships; the
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Pasha increased the amount of tribute he desired from the United States, which was a necessity
to secure peace between the two powers. Since the Tripolitans blurred lines between a desire for
war and peace so frequently, the United States figured if they could not obtain immediate peace,
they might as well destroy Tripolitan power to engage in war. When the Pasha’s demands
exceeded the average payments of other European countries, the United States decided they had
enough.81
Although France was an American ally in the time of the American Revolution, the
French were initially not enthusiastic to help the United States pay a tribute to appease the Pasha.
King Louis XVI even stated he would support the United States against the Barbary threat.
Within Jefferson’s summary of notes on provisions and treaties with France in 1778, he noted:
“H.M.C.M. shall employ his good offices with Marocco or Fez, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli and
the other Barbary powers to provide safety of citizens of the U.S. against the said powers.” The
shaky terms between the United States and France, after the Americans declared neutrality
towards French action in the 1790s, led to a lackadaisical French attitude towards the Barbary
pirates’ attacks on the United States.82
Commodore Preble remained adamant if he was to handle both forces from Tripoli and
Tunis, he would need more support and warships from the United States government. It was at
this time Preble chose to change his strategy. Preble wanted to address the Tunisian problem
before it compounded the Tripolitan conflict, so he set course for Tunis. Through division of the
squadron and distribution of some ships to Tunis, away from Tripoli, Preble hopes to snuff out

81

McKee, 199-206.
Thomas Jefferson, Summary of Notes of Provisions in Treaties with France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 6
February 1778, The Jefferson Papers, Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration,
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Project%3A%22Jefferson%20Papers%22%20barbary&s=1511311111&r=5;
McKee, 207.

82

44

the Tunisian threat as quickly as possible. Preble did not want the Tunisian threat grow to be the
size of the Tripolitan threat. Outside the Barbary states, Preble was suspicious of France, who
now under Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, seemed to favor the United States at war with Tripoli
and Tunis. Preble believed the French favored this conflict since it meant the United States
would blockade ports in Malta the British used.83
Preble respectively kept United States cruisers focused on the Tunisian coast throughout
the summer of 1804 but did not let the Tripolitan threat fall to the wayside. At this time, he was
in preparations for an attack on Tripolitan soil. While the Tripolitans were incredibly successful
pirates, the track record as foot soldiers left little to be desired. After the Tunisian threat was
taken care of, the United States squadron moved closer to the Tripolitan coast. The Tripolitans
were ready to meet them in battle. Rumors of an American attack on the shores of Tripoli swiftly
reached the ears of many. With the end of the blockade of Tripoli, the Americans would have
greater access of Tripoli. American ships, which were a part of the blockade, could now focus
their energy on the attack of the Tripolitan coast. Preble knew this attack would be brutal, as the
United States ships could easily be captured if Tripoli pirates disabled the masts of the ships. On
the other side, the Pasha was ready for his enemy to come ashore.84
In a geographic context, Tunisian ports were furthermore exposed on the Mediterranean
coast, so they served as easy targets for the United States. This situation gave the Bey of Tunis
reason to worry. Since he chose to address the Tunisian threat before the land attack of Tripoli,
Preble was convinced Tunis would not officially declare war against the United States if the tides
turned in favor of the Americans in Tripoli. Preble then focused on the takeover of the Tripolitan
pirates to keep the Tunisian military actions in check. The Bey and other Tunisian decided not to
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declare war on the United States once they saw the increased number of American warships off
the coast. Tunisian fear of the powerful American naval force in the Mediterranean overwhelmed
any possible action they took by 1804. The unpredictable nature of the United States squadron,
along with its possible attack of the Tunisian coast outweighed the financial grievances the Bey
had against the United States. To parallel his Moroccan counterpart, the Bey of Tunis grew
weary of the conflict with the United States.85
Preble knew the United States must strike the city directly in order to obtain success
against Tripoli. In an 1804 diary entry, Preble wrote on July 8: “...we have besides our own men
sixteen Bombardiers or Gunners and seamen on board of each of the Bomb Vessels & Gun Boats
shipped by permission of their government...” Cities on the Tripolitan coast were made of stone,
mud, and mortar. This weak defensive structure encouraged Americans to take it under siege.
American naval ships bombarded several coastal cities, although they did little damage. They
could not make a successful anchorage on the shore of Tripoli, which would have given them
greater direct access to the city. The Americans were at a disadvantage in Preble’s eyes at the
onset of this battle, since the United States ships proved beneficial for naval battles, not for
onshore sieges.86
Preble then decided to send out Americans in his gunboats to Tripoli. After the
distribution of his forces amongst massive cruisers and smaller ships, American ships moved
swifter in the water and sailed at a faster pace. This came in handy when chased by the Tripolitan
pirates along the coast. The newly established navy had made an impact against the Barbary
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pirates. While this occurred, forces began to land on the shore and invade Tripoli. This tactic had
yet to be used in the war, which consisted primarily of naval battles, but it proved to be
successful in the end. The Tripolitan pirates were distracted and taken up with the naval conflict
amid this land attack and did not possess the forces capable to fight off the Americans. Preble
noted the forces he currently possessed in his Memorandum Book in July of 1804: “Saild for the
siege of Tripoly with two bomb vessels six gun boats and the Nautilus and Enterprise in
company.” These Tripolitan pirates were no longer in combat against the small merchant ships
they so easily attacked in the 1790s. This United States Navy now possessed massive schooners
and brigs proved to be swift yet powerful against the pirate attacks, thus they caught the pirates
off guard. Abroad his warship, the Constitution, Preble watched his men successfully bomb and
invade the coastal city in Tripoli. This marked the start of the end of the First Barbary War. The
capture of the Tripolitan city of Derna was enough for the Pasha to officially surrender on June
4, 1805.87
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Portrayal of the final bombardment of Tripoli by the United States, 1805.88

In essence, the United States did not decide to replace the Pasha of Tripoli with his
brother Hamet. While this seemed like a possibility in the midst of the war, American officials
believed this was not necessary when the military was on Tripolitan soil. If the United States
were to avoid any embarrassment in the defeat against Tripoli and force the Pasha to make
peace, the placement Americans on Tripolitan soil was essential. Under the leadership of Preble,
the United States managed to impress the Pasha and state of Tripoli. The Pasha and the
Tripolitans admired the great amount of national spirit and dignity the United States Navy
showcased in the war, thanks to the commands of Preble. The ability for the United States to
make such a comeback in the Mediterranean in the wake of the war was what the Pasha truly
found impressive. The ability for a relatively new nation had been so easy to attack and lost their
prized ships to the pirates to come back and win a war against a fierce state like Tripoli was
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remarkable. As of 1805, news released from the Mediterranean, indicated the Pasha of Tripoli
desired to make peace with the United States. A treaty was drawn between the two antagonistic
forces, in which the Pasha demanded $200,000, in exchange for the simultaneous release of
prisoners of war. The Pasha explicitly pushed for equality in this initiative, in which he
demanded both Tripolitan and American prisoners released at the same time. The United States
was aware they engaged in a treaty with commonly-known barbarians prone to disregard the law.
Due to this, Americans agreed to the Pasha’s terms, as they knew of the sheer urgency to release
American captives in Tripoli.89
With the peace now evident in the Mediterranean, the United States now hoped to engage
in an era of prosperity, specifically with their shipment of goods. While they had bent to the
demands of the Tripolitan state in order to end the First Barbary War, they had shown great
prowess and resiliency to gain them some respect in the region. While the relations between the
Barbary states and the United States did improve in the years after the First Barbary War, the
United States was not able to escape conflict altogether. General threats from the British
increased, along with cumulative amount of impressment of American ships by the Royal Navy.
Now, the War of 1812 was on the horizon. The United States would learn the hard way that
peace with one Barbary state was no guarantee of peace with another.
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Chapter Four: An Ongoing Barbary Threat
Peace seemed imminent in the Mediterranean as time progressed. The treaty between the
United States and Tripoli was officially signed on June 10, 1805 and escorted in a hopeful era of
peace and unbothered commerce. As of 1807, the United States withdrew their final warships
from their squadron in the Mediterranean. The area seemed suited for peace, at least when it
came to the Barbary pirates. The next problem the United States faced` was the increased British
threat. British naval ships impressed more and more American sailors on merchant ships, which
caused President Thomas Jefferson’s Administration to respond with the Embargo Act in 1807.
This congressional legislation closed all United States ports to any export, along with restricted
imports from Great Britain. This act additionally targeted the French, who also impressed
American sailors and confiscated merchant ship cargo and threats grew under the reign of
Napoleon Bonaparte. Congress eventually lifted the Embargo Act in 1809 with the NonIntercourse Act, once James Madison became president, but both the British and the French still
interfered with the United States shipping industry.90
When the War of 1812 broke out in June of 1812, the United States had already lost
much power in the Mediterranean. While the Americans needed to defend the nation on their
own soil, they dealt with a surge in aggressions from the Barbary states, specifically Algiers. It is
important to mention in the time of the War of 1812, the United States had to focus the majority
of its naval attention on the British threat. This took precedence over any threat from pirates in
the Mediterranean, so the Madison Administration removed many of the war ships from the
Mediterranean. While this act possibly saved ships from pirate attacks, it left little to no help or
defense to any remainder of Americans in the Mediterranean. The Dey of Algiers took advantage
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of the inability for Americans to focus on the Barbary threat amid the War of 1812, as they
decided to prey on American merchant ships. Algerian pirates undertook several Americans
captive and forced them into slavery. This was a second verse of the same song Americans had
experienced a decade prior.91

Eighteenth century map of the Mediterranean and Algerian coast.92

While influential figures like President Madison and his Secretary of State, James
Monroe, experienced constant pressure to settle the conflict and prevent the capture of
Americans, the War of 1812 kept them preoccupied. Squabbles occurred in the years between the
Algerian Dey and United States over the matter of tribute payments, but this became intolerable
as the war progressed. Additionally, British supported Algerian pirates attacks on American
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ships added fuel to the fire. While the War of 1812 and Americans were not the primary threat in
the eyes of the British, they were an enemy, nonetheless. At this time, the British devoted the
majority of their military forces to the French threat under Napoleon. However, his defeat at
Waterloo in early 1815 freed up their forces to aid the Barbary states.93
Relations seemed friendly between the United States and the Barbary states in the
interwar period. Some would even say these relations were uneventful. However, these friendly
relations came to an end in July of 1812, specifically between the state of Algiers and the United
States. At this point the War of 1812 had erupted in North America and the Madison
Administration could not handle a simultaneous conflict in the Mediterranean. Someone who had
been on the inside of the situation in Algiers was Consul Tobias Lear, an American peace envoy
assigned to the Mediterranean. Lear had a great deal of experience in diplomacy, as he served as
a key negotiator in Tripoli at the end of the First Barbary War. However, several years later, the
Dey of Algiers claimed the United States owed Algiers $27,000 in tribute sums, which was
greater than Lear had been told. There was also discrepancy over when the money was to be
paid, as the standard calendar differed in the number of days between Algiers and the United
States. this conflict contributed to Lear’s expulsion from Algiers. The Dey of Algiers expelled
the Consul General Tobias Lear in early 1812, which ended years of peace between the two
nations.94
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Tobias Lear, who’s expulsion from Algiers sparked the Second Barbary War.95

The United States had an additional problem of the acquisition of access to the Algerian
threat in the time of the War of 1812. The British had established a naval blockade along the
Atlantic seaboard early in the war, which extended from New England to Spanish Florida. This
blockade was responsible for the enclosure of the United States within their own realm. Even if
President Madison wanted to help by the dispatch of a squadron to the Mediterranean, he could
not. Despite this obstacle, the United States proved to be successful in battle, especially in singleship victories against the Royal Navy. Once the War of 1812 ended with the Treaty of Ghent,
less than a week later, the United States was at war with Algiers. Amid the War of 1812, the
Madison Administration could not afford to deal with the conflict in the Mediterranean directly,
as the British invasion on their own soil was of the utmost importance. While Algiers continued
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to take over ships of American merchantmen, the United States hoped American businessmen
and diplomats located in the Mediterranean could handle the situation and pay the ransom for the
sailors. After the murder of the current leader of Algiers in 1815, a new Dey was put into power,
named Omar, who would be the Dey the United States would directly confront.96
In retaliation towards the aggression of the War of 1812, the United States pushed for an
act to be passed in early 1815 to protect commerce of the United States against Algerian cruisers.
President Madison fed up with the Algerian pirates as the final obstacle to American free
commerce in the Mediterranean, was ready to end conflict altogether. In the midst of an address
to Congress on this action, President Madison stated the Dey had engaged in: “...acts of more
overt and direct warfare against the citizens of the United States trading in the Mediterranean,
some of whom are still detained in captivity, notwithstanding the attempts which have been
made to ransom them, and are treated with the rigor usual on the coast of Barbary.” Madison also
mentioned the United States had never engaged in hostilities against the Barbary states,
especially Algiers, in the time prior to the Dey’s harsh actions. About a week after the War of
1812 ended, President Madison posed to Congress an official declaration war on Algiers on
February 23, 1815. Congress authorized this action on March 3, 1815.97
In regard to the mission to Algiers, the primary goals were evident: ensure the release of
American prisoners, obtain peace before all-out warfare, and to not pay tribute. As mentioned by
Secretary of State Monroe, the United States was to go into the Mediterranean with the ultimate
ambition to create permanent peace with not only Algiers, but the Barbary states as a whole. The
American warship, Guerrière, was swiftly prepared to lead a United States naval squadron to
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the Mediterranean. The Guerrière was a seventy-four gun frigate that demonstrated the growth
of naval prowess in the time between the First and Second Barbary Wars. Two squadrons were
ordered to the Mediterranean under Commodore William Bainbridge and Commodore Stephen
Decatur. The assignment of such a large squadron showcased the naval might the United States
had amassed amid the interwar period between the First Barbary War and the Second Barbary
War. War with Great Britain had come to an end and the Americans now had the ability to send
such a naval presence to the Mediterranean, meant they desired both respect in the
Mediterranean and the release of enslaved Americans, taken captive in the Barbary states. The
third American sent on this journey to achieve peace in Algiers was William Shaler of
Connecticut. Shaler was chosen by the Madison Administration to be the chief negotiator in this
mission. As mentioned by Shaler, this opportunity seemed to be: “...an employment very
distinguished in itself, surrounded with all ‘the pomp and glorious circumstances of war’; and in
many respects more agreeable than anything at this time in the gift of the government....” The
team of Bainbridge, Decatur, and Shaler was a collaboration of naval might and diplomatic
expertise, which a hopeful President Madison put together to accomplish one objective: secure
peace.98
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Commodore Stephen Decatur.99

A mass of naval ships set off to venture to the Mediterranean, which was unlike any
naval tactic seen in the time of the First Barbary War. Furthermore, Bainbridge, Decatur, and
Shaler proved ready to enter the fight against the pirates of Algiers. The men had hoped their
actions in the Mediterranean showcased extreme power, which would help show they meant
business and did not want to mess around. The Americans were given specific instructions for
their mission to Algiers from the Madison Administration. They were to force the Dey to sign a
treaty which stated the United States would no longer have to pay tribute sums to Algiers.
Commodore Decatur was additionally ordered to create a naval blockade of Algiers immediately
upon his arrival. Aware of past relations between Algiers and the United States, Secretary of
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State Monroe warned the Americans not too hastily rush into a treaty, but instead to make sure
any treaty signed would consist of the terms the Americans demanded. Algiers had a pattern of
engagement in treaties they had no intention to abide by to which Monroe was painfully aware of
and sought to avoid. Thus, with a squadron of seventeen warships, the Americans sailed from the
United States to the Mediterranean Sea. The party left for the Mediterranean on May 20, 1815.100
After years of war against the Barbary states and fresh out of a war against Great Britain,
the United States did not hesitate to engage in acts of war right upon arrival in the
Mediterranean. Once there, the Americans overtook the Algerian warship Mashuda in June of
1815. This ship lingered along the Spanish coast and attacked any American merchant ships
ventured this way. The Algerian pirates were overwhelmed by the size of the naval force the
Americans sent to the Mediterranean and quickly realized the Americans were serious.
Relatively quickly after the naval encounter with the Mashuda, peace talks were already in the
works. Negotiations were eventually conducted on the Guerrière between the Americans and the
Algerians.101
While in correspondence with Monroe on the subject of the peace talks, Shaler stated:
“The regency has been very prompt in executing the conditions of the treaty as far as has yet
depended on them. They sent me one hundred and twenty-seven bales of cotton, and the ten
thousand dollars stipulated for the fourth article, which I regarded as a full compliance with that
stipulation.” Bainbridge, Decatur, and Shaler were initially sent with $30,000 as well, to use for
the negotiation, yet had no intention of this continuous tribute payment. This instead served as a
customary consular present to Algiers at the time of the negotiation process. In the end, Shaler
went ashore to physically sign the treaty on behalf of the United States with Algiers on June 19,
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1815. The treaty created was eventually sent back to the United States and approved by the
Senate in a matter of months. The Second Barbary War itself ended before the year, 1815, was
over.102
The overall goal of the treaty was to end American tribute payments, not solely to Algiers
but to all Barbary states. They also wanted to put a stop to the continuous practice of the Barbary
pirates, which consisted of the capture and enslavement of American merchantmen. This practice
did not sit well with many in the United States and they wanted to see a final end to it. These
crucial objectives were kept in mind in the midst of the United States’ diplomatic negotiations in
1815. Despite the emphasis on the end of this practice, the United States did promise to provide
Algiers with occasional gifts. Algiers furthermore saw the time in which this treaty was signed as
apropos, as they were at war already with Italy, Spain, Prussia, Holland, Russia, and Denmark.
They could not handle a prolonged conflict with the United States in addition to these conflicts.
Their once stable position of the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean became weaker by the
year, as their devious activities were less of a threat toward the increased naval powers of larger
countries. Shaler would eventually go on to become the Consul General of the Barbary states.
This position provided him not only with oversight to the activities of other American Consuls in
the Barbary states, but also to their expenditures in Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco.103
Once the treaty was signed, the United States hoped the Barbary states would finally
recognize and respect the rights of the United States in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the
American prisoners, not only in Algiers, but the entirety of the Barbary states, were set to be
released. Afterall, the United States had now been a nation for thirty-nine years and was no
longer inexperienced in war and diplomacy. The hope of the United States to participate freely in
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commerce throughout the world had become a reality. A combination of the War of 1812 and the
Second Barbary War had fostered a new sense of national identity within the United States. With
a severe lack of Federalist presence in Congress in 1815, there was no partisan split in the
aftermath of this war. This differed tremendously from the First Barbary War. While the First
Barbary War was one fought with a relatively weak navy, the Second Barbary War demonstrated
the growth of the nation’s defense in wartime. The War of 1812, along with other global
conflicts, were responsible for the increase in defense, along with the United States’ increased
education on how to conduct diplomatic endeavors on the world’s stage. The Second Barbary
War came at a time when the United States was sick of bullies and had proved their own might,
won a war against one of the greatest military powers in the world, Great Britain. The lessons the
United States learned from both their successes and failures in the First Barbary War allowed
them to become better suited to snuff out any spark of war in the Mediterranean quicker than it
had been lit.104
A crucial connection between the War of 1812 and the Second Barbary War was the
tremendous expansion of the United States Navy. The growth of the navy at the time of the War
of 1812 provided the United States with an unmatched naval presence they severely lacked at the
time of the First Barbary War. This growth of the navy strongly contributed to the new
diplomatic tactics which allowed the Second Barbary War to be a more initial success than the
First Barbary War. The quickly obtained United States’ victory in the Second Barbary War
ushered in a unity within America which had not occurred since the days of the American
Revolution. A few years later, Secretary of State Monroe would become the fifth president of the
United States and ushered in an era of peacetime dubbed the Era of Good Feelings. At this time,
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Monroe further proved the point which the United States had overcome any additional bullies.
His establishment of the Monroe Doctrine told the rest of the world: “...It is only when our rights
are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense...”
The president put a stop to the attempts of countries took advantage of the United States once
and for all.105

James Monroe, former Secretary of State and President of the United States.106
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Chapter Five: Concerning Pirates
The First Barbary War broke out when the United States was barely an established
nation. The North African Barbary states of Morocco, Tripoli, Algiers, and Tunis viewed the
new nation as a prime target to prey upon in the Mediterranean at the time of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. After trial and error diplomatic efforts under the weak Articles of
Confederation, Americans managed to replace this with the Constitution and implement strong
leadership to help establish the nation domestically and internationally. After they lost their
safety net under the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, the United States became subject to
tribute sum payments to the Barbary states, in hopes to ensure safe passage on ships within the
Mediterranean. This became commonplace practice by other European nations, but the demand
of money was burdensome on the already indebted United States. However, no sum of money
was enough for the Barbary pirates, who focused their energy on the capture and enslavement
American merchantmen in the North African states. This piracy began long before the turn of the
nineteenth century, but by the time this rolled around, the United States was sick of bullies in the
Mediterranean. Their desire to engage in fair commerce in the Mediterranean lessened
tremendously.
Although treaties had previously been made between the United States and the Barbary
states, notably in the 1790s, the Barbary states seldom kept their word in such formal diplomatic
agreements. Between the Washington Administration and the Jefferson Administration, the
number of captives taken by the Barbary pirates had reached well over one hundred, a distasteful
number for the Americans to see. Due to the increased Barbary threat, key figures like George
Washington found it essential for the United States Navy to be rebuilt and dispatched to the
Mediterranean. In the subsequent years the American Revolution, the United States Navy
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gradually disappeared, as those in charge did not view it as a necessity in peacetime. With war
on the horizon in the Mediterranean, the need to rebuild a naval defensive operation was of the
utmost importance.
Tripoli served as the primary aggressor in the First Barbary War. After many attempts on
behalf of President Thomas Jefferson and United States Consuls in the Mediterranean, the Pasha
of Tripoli’s rage about the lack of tribute payments came to a head. On May 10, 1801, Tripoli
declared war on the United States. The United States’ immediate response was to send out
several American frigates to the Mediterranean, with an increased production of naval ships back
home. When Captain Andrew Sterett and his crew on the warship Enterprize were attacked in
1801, the United States quickly fought back against the Tripolitan pirates. In the end, they were
able to take over some Tripolitan ships and gain an early victory for the United States in the
Mediterranean.
A crucial military and diplomatic measure the United States took was to secure a naval
blockade of Tripoli and not allow ships in or out of their waters. This gradually weakened Tripoli
amid the course of the war. Alliances were evident between Barbary states when the United
States captured the Tripolitan ship Meshuda in 1802. After a great deal of negotiation, the United
States agreed to release the ship into the custody of the Sultan of Morocco, provided it not be
returned to Tripoli. Relations with Morocco had been shaken upon the onset of the war, but the
United States could not afford for the situation to worsen while they were already in combat
against Tripoli. While United States Navy leaders like Commodore Edward Preble managed to
wage war against Moroccan warships when they came too close to American ships or to the aid
of the other Barbary states, the United States eventually secured a peace with this Barbary state
in the midst of war with another.
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The United States had a relatively successful track record in the First Barbary War by the
year 1803. Nonetheless, the tides turned with the capture of the American frigate Philadelphia in
October of the same year. The Philadelphia’s Captain, William Bainbridge, and his entire crew
were captured after a naval battle. The ship was moved to the Tripolitan harbor and appeared as a
prize won by the Tripolitan pirates. This served as a massive embarrassment for the United
States and demonstrated the immense capability of the pirates in wartime, unbeknownst to the
United States. Another American naval leader, Commodore Stephen Decatur, made an attempted
rescue mission of the Philadelphia and the crew in 1804, but it became evident his actions would
not succeed immediately. In the hopes that the Tripolitans would not possess such a prized
warship, Decatur and his crew set fire to the Philadelphia in the Tripolitan harbor.
In this fight against Tripoli, another Barbary state grew as a threat against the United
States. Constant conflict with Tunis, though not an all-out war, plagued the United States Navy.
At this time, the American naval forces were battered and bruised by the constant Mediterranean
naval encounters. The Bey of Tunis believed the United States did not treat them well compared
to other Barbary states, notably with their lack of tribute payment. The United States could not
afford to split up their naval squadron, in fights with Tripoli on one end and Tunis on the other,
so they attempted to secure a quick peace with Tunisian leaders. Although the war did not seem
to be on the side of the United States in 1804, this diplomatic action proved to favor the United
States to finally place all of their focus on Tripoli.
By 1805, Commodore Preble and the United States were ready for the First Barbary War
to come to a close. Preble knew while the Tripolitan pirates were skilled at naval battle, but they
were not experienced foot soldiers. It became evident the best way to win the war would be by
the placement of Americans on Tripolitan soil to fight. This idea of a direct land strike against
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Tripoli proved successful in the end. In the midst of the distraction of Tripolitan pirates in naval
battle, Americans were able to go to the shores of Tripoli and have an easy victory against the
Tripolitans. This bombardment of Tripoli resulted in a surrender from Pasha Yusuf on June 4,
1805, with a treaty signed shortly after.
The subsequent years ushered in peacetime between the United States and the Barbary
states. While President Jefferson put the Embargo Act in place in 1807, which prevented the
movement of foreign ships in or out of the United States, the state of affairs in the Mediterranean
were uneventful. Even after the Embargo Act was repealed by the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809,
the Barbary states upheld their end of the treaty. It was not until 1812 when relations with the
Barbary states noticeably shifted. In the eyes of states like Algiers, the United States seemed like
a relatively easy target, as more and more ships were overtaken by British impressment at the
time of this inter-war period. Furthermore, any United States naval presence previously in the
Mediterranean had been moved to concentrate on the British threat. Without protection for
merchant ships, Algerian pirates took advantage of the little defense Americans had in this
region and took more American captive, which forced them yet again into slavery.
The expulsion of Consul Tobias Lear by Algiers in early 1812 was the first major
treacherous act which spurred the Second Barbary War. Lear, who had previously served as a
negotiator in the treaty ended the First Barbary War, angered the Dey of Algiers when the United
States refused to pay the increased tribute sum demanded. While the Algerian pirates captured
many American merchantmen at the time of the War of 1812, fights against the British was not a
useless distraction for the United States. The United States was incredibly successful navally in
the War of 1812 and used this time to further build up their naval forces. Once the United States
achieved victory against Great Britain, President James Madison set his sights on the creation of
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an end to the Barbary conflict once and for all. Less than a week after the War of 1812 ended the
United States had declared war on Algiers in February of 1815.
A trio of American military and diplomatic experts were sent to the Mediterranean on the
massive warship Guerrière in mid-1815. This tactful trio consisted of the experienced
Commodore William Bainbridge and Commodore Stephen Decatur, along with William Shaler,
whose incredible diplomatic prowess was impressive to say the least. Shaler’s experience during
the negotiations during the War of 1812 as Secretary to the United States peace delegation made
him the perfect candidate to engage in such diplomacy. Upon their arrival to the Mediterranean,
they encounter the Algerian warship Mashuda, which they beat in naval battle at an
extraordinary speed. This signified the United States meant business and were not in the mood to
fool around. Secretary of State James Monroe heeded caution to the men the fact of Algiers had
not kept their word on past treaties, thusly to be wary of any agreements. Once the Americans
arrived in Algiers, peace was secured relatively quickly on the terms of the United States. Their
hopes of release of American prisoners, fortification of trade in the Mediterranean without pirate
attacks, and an end to tribute payment to all Barbary states were ensured. The Second Barbary
War ended almost as quickly as it had begun on June 19, 1815.
The United States grew into a cohesive nation in the aftermath of the Second Barbary
War. The nation was no longer a new, weak country, instead one which had achieved success
against the likes of Great Britain and the Barbary states. With the end of the Federalist party in
the United States post-War of 1812, a lack of partisan divide welcomed such unity. Once former
Secretary of State Monroe became president, he ushered in what became known as an Era of
Good Feelings set the tone for the United States for years to come.
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Essentially, the Barbary Wars were a cornerstone in the development of the United States
as a nation. While they had previously experienced conflict on a global scale, their decision to
remain neutral and not engage in warfare came to a halt once the nineteenth century began. The
United States, who had already broken away from a tyrannical king, would no longer be subject
to North African states who attempted to claim power over them. While the Americans had an
inexperienced Navy come the First Barbary War, they were able to learn from both their
successes and defeats, in which they came out on top in the end. This first victory signified their
resilience against the brutal pirates, along with their ability to fight tooth and nail. With the
Second Barbary War, the United States was ready to meet the Barbary states in war, thus they
proved their possession of an amplified naval presence, unafraid of swift action to achieve their
means in the Mediterranean.
While war with the Barbary states was not the first choice of engagement in diplomacy of
the Jefferson Administration or the United States in the nineteenth century, it was a necessary
evil which shaped the United States into a savvier nation. The ability to learn how to engage in
diplomacy and war on the scale of other European nations at the time took considerable practice
and several setbacks. However, this allowed the United States to grow in power and prowess.
The sheer increase in warships and skilled naval tactics in the War of 1812 could be viewed as a
chain reaction from the skills gained in the First Barbary War, which led to the record-pace of
peace achieved in the Second Barbary War. Without these crucial wars, the United States would
never have achieved the ability to freely trade and sail in the Mediterranean, which contributed to
their eventual growth into a superpower in years to come.
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